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PARENTING AGREEMENTS, THE POTENTIAL
POWER OF CONTRACT,
AND THE LIMITS OF FAMILY LAW
KATHERINE M. SWIFT *
ABSTRACT
There has been a trend among feminists and family law scholars toward privatization. The idea is that private agreements can take the
place of public marriage contracts. Private agreements can determine
property disposition, confer the right to make medical decisions, and,
potentially at least, also confer parental status on a nonbiological parent. But the scholarly trend does not fully address how courts treat private family agreements when children are involved. In short, family
courts do not enforce contracts regarding children. Biology and adoption tend to be the only way to achieve parentage. In custody and visitation proceedings, courts follow the “best-interests-of-the-child” doctrine
to determine who should play the part of parent, regardless of contrary
parental intent. This Article describes the conflict between the scholarly
trend toward privatization and the family court reality. The Article
then argues that properly drafted parenting agreements should be enforced by family courts, both in determining parental status and in determining custody. In other words, custody courts should not be allowed to disregard parenting agreements in the course of an ad hoc
best-interests analysis. Parents—biological, adoptive, and contractual—should be on the same footing in the best-interests evaluation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
M. and J.A. 1 dealt with an increasingly common problem when
they decided to have a baby. Because they are both women, their
marriage is not recognized by the state where they live. Therefore,
the child of one is not automatically recognized as the child of the
other. They went ahead with artificial insemination anyway, using
sperm from an anonymous donor so the “father’s” parental rights
would not be an issue, and in October 2006, J.A. gave birth to a boy.
“We thought a lot about the law when we were considering using a
known donor,” says J.A. “[T]here are many legal issues that can come
into play when you are asking someone to give up their parental
rights. We’ve heard some of the horror stories about donors (or their
family members) later fighting for custody and winning. We are
happy that we won’t have to deal with those types of issues.” Still,
there will be issues. “Mostly we want to figure out how/if we can do a
[second-]parent adoption,” J.A. says. 2 M. and J.A. know of one family
law judge in their state who performs second-parent adoptions for
gay couples. That state is not named here, because M. and J.A. fear
that if this judge draws attention for performing such adoptions, the
state legislature may react by banning the practice. “If we can’t do
the [second-]parent adoption, what type of documents do we need to
put in place to assure [M.] custody and other parental rights?”
The answer to this question is unclear. There has been a trend in
family law toward privatization, and some scholars argue that private family agreements can take the place of the marriage contract
1. M. and J.A. shared their story via e-mail. See E-mail from M. and J.A. to author
(Mar. 7, 2005, 16:25:35 CST) (on file with author). Initials are used to preserve anonymity.
2. “Second-parent adoption” refers to the procedure whereby the spouse or partner of
a biological parent adopts the child of that parent without terminating the biological parent’s parental rights. After the adoption, both parents have equal parenting rights in the
child. Second-parent adoption is distinguished from traditional adoption in that the latter
requires the biological parent to give up all parental rights. See infra Part II.D.
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in providing parenting rights and responsibilities. 3 Such contracts
may become even more prevalent as constitutional amendments
banning gay marriage are passed throughout the country. 4 But establishing parental status is only the first half of the equation. When
that status really matters—in a custody dispute, for example—family
courts may implicitly disregard parental status in determining the
best interests of the child. Moreover, even establishing parental
status in the first place is a large hurdle because under most state
statutes, parentage is largely a function of biology. 5 Even if a family
law court nominally enforces a contract establishing status, the court
may find that its own ad hoc assessment of the child’s best interests
trumps the parents’ agreement. In other words, any contract regarding parental status between same-sex parents is unlikely to be enforced because of these twin obstacles: (1) the statutory requirements
for establishing parental status and (2) the best-interests analysis.
The best-interests doctrine, and family law generally, is suffused
with notions of conscience and equity not present in traditional contract cases. Family law does not respect the traditional rules of contract. Thus, principles protecting expectations and reliance do not
apply in the family law setting. Though well-intentioned, family
courts may place unwarranted obstacles between parents who have
tried to create rights via contract and their children. This issue is not
limited to gay parents, but it is particularly pertinent to them because often one gay parent is not biologically related to the child.
Unmarried heterosexual parents, though they face similar obstacles
to establishing parental status, are generally helped by being able to
point to a biological relationship with the child. More broadly, the
conflict between contract and family law highlighted here reveals
that all parents—even married heterosexuals—may face limits in attempting to modify their rights and responsibilities to their children.
This Article addresses the limits family law puts on parents and
children, as exemplified by the conflict between contract doctrine and
the best-interests doctrine. In particular, family law limits who may
be a parent, both in status and in practice. The conflict is starkest
3. See infra note 9.
4. As many as “45 states have approved constitutional amendments or statutes to
define traditional marriage in a way that would bar same-sex marriage.” Shailagh Murray,
Gay Marriage Amendment Fails in Senate, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A01. Some of
these laws may also ban contracts designed to establish rights similar to those established
by marriage. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2004) (banning any “civil union, partnership
contract or other arrangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the
privileges or obligations of marriage”). Laws like the one in Virginia notwithstanding, it
seems likely that gay couples increasingly will turn to private agreements to try to create
permanent, formal family rights for themselves and their children.
5. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973) (defining “parent and child relationship” as including only “the legal relationship . . . between a child and his natural or
adoptive parents”).

916

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:913

where a nonbiological, same-sex parent 6 seeks custody of a child.
First, that parent’s status might not be recognized if it is established
by contract. Second, even if parental status is recognized, family
courts may still grant custody to the biological parent, implicitly
or explicitly determining that to do so is in the child’s best interests, notwithstanding agreements between the parents manifesting a contrary intent.
This Article proposes a two-part solution to this problem. First,
courts should recognize contracts between unmarried parents establishing parental status. Second, such contracts should receive consideration in any subsequent best-interests analysis. In other words,
courts should not use the open-ended nature of the best-interests
analysis to undo the rights and responsibilities the parents have established by contract. States have a compelling interest in the welfare of their children and are therefore unlikely to take a hands-off
approach to these cases; they should at least treat unmarried parents
with a valid parenting agreement—contractual parents—the same
way they treat married parents or adoptive parents. Contractual parents should enter the best-interests evaluation on equal footing. In
practice, this approach would require family courts to defer to parenting contracts in the course of determining a child’s best interests.
To be clear, the parenting contract contemplated by this Article
would establish merely parental status. It would not address custody
or visitation rights. A large part of this Article’s project is to separate
the issue of status from the issue of custody and visitation. The law
treats these issues separately, but courts often conflate them. Parenting status tends to be governed by biology (one aspect of the law
that this Article argues for changing) or by establishment of a legal
parenting relationship with the child (usually by adoption). Custody
and visitation are governed by best-interests analysis. As discussed below, both types of analysis disadvantage gay, nonbiological parents. 7
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the trend of
privatization in family law. What is called “privatization” here could
also be conceptualized as the state’s loosening of the reins on the evolution of family relationships. This Part covers the shift from legal
6. The same-sex partner of a biological parent is referred to here as the “nonbiological parent,” although using the term “parent” assumes one of the points in question. This is
intentional. These partners are parents inasmuch as they intend, with the biological parent, to bring a child into the world or at least to rear that child. Some courts have referred
to these partners as “functional parents,” “psychological parents,” or “de facto parents” because they fulfill the role of parent despite their lack of a biological or legal connection. The
term used here is similar, but “nonbiological parent” or “same-sex parent” is more specific.
7. Adoption law reveals how the issues can become intertwined. Adoption is principally about establishing parental status in the adoptive parent, but (inasmuch as adoptive
parents often have no biological connection to the child) the law requires that any adoption
be in the child’s best interests. See infra Part II.D.
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recognition of only traditional heterosexual families to the allowance
of private modifications to marriage contracts (notably including
premarital agreements and surrogacy agreements) and, ultimately,
to the limited recognition of so-called alternative family arrangements. Part II discusses the best-interests-of-the-child doctrine and
its use today as an ad hoc method of resolving family disputes that
may deny same-sex parents of rights they have attempted to create
by contract. This Part concludes with a discussion of the law surrounding second-parent adoption, which, though not universally
available, is the only sure method of securing parental rights for
same-sex, nonbiological parents. Part III proposes a new approach:
enforcement of parenting agreements so that “contractual parents”
would be treated the same as married, biological, or adoptive parents
in a best-interests analysis. The parenting agreement would eliminate the priority often given to the biological parent so that both parents have an equal shot at custody as well as equal rights and responsibilities to the child outside the courtroom. 8
II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF FAMILY LAW
This Part discusses the shift from state-defined, one-size-fits-all
legal families to state acceptance of limited, private modifications to
those legal relationships. Scholars have argued that the logical conclusion of this shift is widespread use of contract to establish privately what cannot be established publicly, including parental
rights. 9 There is a debate over whether marriage rights should be the
ultimate goal for same-sex couples, but that debate is beyond the
scope of this Article. 10 However, it is worth considering that the move

8. For example, the nonbiological parent would also be on equal footing with the biological parent in making medical decisions for the child. Courts struggle with cases of parental disagreement even where parents are on equal footing, suggesting that where there
is an opportunity to prefer one parent (biological) over the other (nonbiological), courts will
take it. See generally In re K.I., 735 A.2d 448, 453–56 (D.C. 1999) (holding that, where the
mother had been deemed neglectful and the parents disagreed about medical treatment,
the court had the power to implement a do-not-resuscitate order against the mother’s
wishes because it was found to be in the child’s best interests).
9. See generally, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and
Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2004)
(arguing that the law should abandon its interest in determining biological paternity and
concentrate instead on contracts for paternity); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 48–49 (1996) (arguing that contracts regarding childrearing, support, and custody ought to be enforced, so long as they are negotiated with the
child’s best interests in mind); Jill Schachner Chanen, The Changing Face of Gay Legal Issues, A.B.A. J., July 2004, at 46, 49–50 (advising on the importance of having contracts detailing family agreements but also pointing out that second-parent adoption is the best
way to ensure rights regarding children).
10. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 60–61 (1996) (describing the debate among gay rights
and feminist advocates about whether gay marriage is worth the fight).
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toward contract may be as much normative as it is strategic. Many
same-sex couples would not marry if they could because they believe
marriage is a hierarchical, sexist arrangement between a dominant
man and a submissive woman. 11 For them, contract offers a more
egalitarian model where both parties are presumed to be on equal
footing for bargaining purposes. 12 On the other hand, the use of contract may be simply strategic for couples trying to create the rights
that exist between formally married couples.
This Part begins with a refresher in the basics of contract doctrine, both to orient the reader and to highlight the contrast between
the objective nature of contract theory and the subjective, normsladen realm of family law.
A. Contract Basics
Courts ordinarily enforce contracts between two parties where
there has been an offer, acceptance, and consideration. 13 Courts tend
not to look closely at the nature of the consideration. So long as the
parties know what they are bargaining for and their bargaining
power is not so unequal that the contract is unconscionable, courts
generally take a hands-off approach and enforce the contract. 14
Courts enforce the contract terms that are objectively manifest. They
do not look for the subjective intentions of the parties at the time
they entered the agreement. 15 The theory behind these principles is
that private parties should be allowed to order their conduct privately and that courts should enforce the agreements they make
without passing judgment on those agreements, so long as they are
not illegal or in violation of public policy. 16 Where a contract is not il11. See id.
12. See supra note 9.
13. “A contract by ancient definition, is ‘an agreement between competent parties,
upon a consideration sufficient in law, to do or not do a particular thing.’ ” Steinberg v.
Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Ill. 1977) (quoting People v. Dummer, 113 N.E.
934, 935 (Ill. 1916)). “An offer, an acceptance . . . , and consideration . . . are basic ingredients of a contract.” Id. at 639.
14. See Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 544–45, 548–51 (1891) (enforcing a contract
between an uncle and his nephew where the uncle promised to pay the nephew if he gave
up carousing); see also Dahl v. HEM Pharms. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1993)
(discussing Hamer v. Sidway).
15. See Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778–79 (1907)
(holding that a contract is created if the words used therein would be interpreted as a contract by a reasonable person, regardless of the parties’ subjective intentions); see also
Townsend v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 196 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999)
(discussing Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co.).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (1981) (“A public policy against
the enforcement of promises or other terms may be derived by the court from (a) legislation
relevant to such a policy, or (b) the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare . . . .”);
see also Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 14 N.E.2d 798, 799–800 (N.Y. 1938)
(concluding that a defense of legal compulsion based on the Nazi laws of Germany, in a
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legal, courts generally look only for “(1) the existence of a contract,
(2) performance by the plaintiff, (3) a breach by the defendant, and
(4) damage or loss to the plaintiff.” 17 The remainder of this Part addresses the contractarian nature of marriage and family and how it
has changed from a state-defined institution to one defined, at least
somewhat, by private parties.
B. Marriage and Family: Public Institutions
It is commonly said that courts will not enforce contracts for sex. 18
However, “[o]ur law considers marriage in no other light than as a
civil contract.” 19 If marriage is a contract, and the state officially condones only marital sex, then marriage is fundamentally a contract
for sex. Because marriage is a contract, it must be based on a binding
offer and acceptance. 20 No particular words are required to create a
marriage contract. It is sufficient that both parties agree to the engagement, 21 so long as they have the legal capacity to enter the contract 22 and it is free from duress or fraud. 23
Marriage and family are essentially public institutions defined by
the state. This may seem counterintuitive insofar as the privacy of
the family has been used for centuries to shield marital rape and
child abuse from criminal and civil sanctions. 24 But families are pubsuit by a Jew for wrongful discharge by his German employer, does not violate the public
policy of New York).
17. See, e.g., Alpha Telecomms., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 194 F. App’x 385, 389
(6th Cir. 2006).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 (1981) (declaring unenforceable
any promise to “change some essential incident of the marital relationship”);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 587 (1932) (“A bargain between married persons or
persons contemplating marriage to change the essential incidents of marriage is illegal.”); see
also, e.g., Roush v. Battin, 30 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Wis. 1947) (holding that “illicit cohabitation”—
presumably a euphemism for sex—cannot be consideration for an agreement to marry).
19. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: REVISED AND ABRIDGED 300
(Henry Winthrop Ballentine ed., Blackstone Inst., Modern American Law No. 15, 1915).
20. See, e.g., Abdallah v. Sarsour, No. CH-2005-2339, 2006 WL 1134034, at *1 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 20, 2006) (finding that a marriage contract was not void for lack of consideration where there was an offer to marry and an acceptance).
21. See id.
22. See Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding that the state was within its parens patriae power when it determined that
minors lacked the capacity to marry); see also Lowe v. Quinn, 267 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 1971)
(holding that an agreement to marry is void as against public policy where one of the parties is already married to a third party and that the agreed marriage is not saved “by the
fact that the married individual contemplated a divorce and that the agreement was conditioned on procurement of the divorce”).
23. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Marquart, 178 N.W. 428, 428–30 (N.D. 1920) (holding that
where the defendant breached his promise to marry, he could rebut the claim with proof that
he had been released from the contract by his fiancée’s agreement to marry another man).
24. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201
(1989) (holding that the state does not have an affirmative duty to protect a child from
harm by his parent, a private individual, even if the state knows of the danger to the child).
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lic in the sense that they are publicly defined. Traditionally, “family”
meant a heterosexual married couple and their children. When
straight couples marry, one set of legal consequences automatically
attaches to their union. 25 They do not have to write their own contract specifying what it means to them to be married or which burdens and benefits they intend to assume. The state has defined marriage for them. The state decides who may marry and how those who
marry may divorce. 26 And, although marriages are infinitely varied,
everyone understands what it means to be “married” without having
to inquire, “what sort of marriage are you in?” Married means one
thing in the eyes of the law.
1. What “Married” Means to the State
At common law, the husband and wife were one person. 27 Marriage subsumed the wife’s identity into that of the husband; he
owned her property, and only he could represent her in court. 28 Marital rape was not rape, legally speaking, 29 and if she left the marriage,
he retained custody of the children. 30 Marriage was a patriarchal
man-woman dichotomy. This framework was rigid and did not allow
for alternative arrangements—that is, children born out of wedlock

25. As one scholar has noted,
Perhaps the most significant way the law traditionally regulated intimate
behavior was by distinguishing sharply, in virtually all important contexts, between married persons and persons in nonmarital intimate relationships.
Through laws criminalizing adultery, fornication and nonmarital cohabitation,
the law carved out marriage as the only legitimate arena for sexual intercourse. Tort causes of action for enticement, alienation of affections and criminal conversation penalized third parties who intentionally interfered with the
marriage relationship; loss of consortium claims protected husbands (and later
wives) against those who negligently impaired marital relations. No similar
doctrines protected nonmarital intimate relationships from deliberate or negligent third party impairment.
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1447 (citations omitted).
26. Marjorie Maguire Shultz (among others) has made this same observation and
highlighted the irony that “precisely in that zone where exclusion of contractual principles
is justified on the ground that family life is too ‘private’ for legal intervention, there we impose standardized public content about the expectations and obligations of intimacy.”
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and Careers, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 55, 60 (1991).
27. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 304.
28. See id.; see also Fleming v. Griswold, 3 Hill 85, 85–87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (holding that a wife’s inability to sue due to coverture did not prevent the statute of limitations
from running against her).
29. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 856 (Found. Press 2001) (explaining that under the marital rape exception “no amount of force and explicitness of nonconsent makes particular sex acts into rape”).
30. See id. at 554 (noting the rule granting custody only to fathers, which was replaced with the presumption that the mother would win custody, which was replaced with
the best interests doctrine).
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were denied the benefits of “legitimate” children. 31 The wife could not
be the dominant partner within a marriage, nor could husband and
wife establish equal roles. Neither wife and wife nor husband and
husband could fit themselves into the established mold. This latter
restriction still applies in most states. 32
Today the publicly defined marriage contract is far less rigid and
also far less sexist. Women are legally independent of their husbands, and the marital rape exception has been largely abolished. 33
Marriage also entails numerous rights and benefits for the couple.
The following is a representative list, compiled by Professor William
Eskridge:
•

•
•

•

•

•

•
•
•
•

The right to receive, or the obligation to provide, spousal support, and (in the event of separation or divorce) alimony and
an equitable division of property
Preference in being appointed the personal representative of an
intestate decedent . . .
Priority in being appointed guardian of an incapacitated
[spouse] or in being recognized as [making health-care decisions for that spouse]
All manner of rights relating to the involuntary hospitalization
of the spouse, including the right to petition, the right to be
notified, and the right to initiate proceedings leading to release
The right to bring a lawsuit for the wrongful death of the
spouse and for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
through harm to one’s spouse
The right to spousal benefits statutorily guaranteed to public
employees, including health and life insurance and disability
payments, plus similar contractual benefits for private sector
employees
The right to invoke special state protection for “intrafamily offenses”
The right to visit one’s spouse on furlough while incarcerated in
prison
The right to claim an evidentiary privilege for marital communications
A presumption of joint ownership of real estate as a tenancy in
common and a right not to be held to a mortgage or assignment of rights to creditors without the spouse’s written permission

31. See id. at 577 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 434 (Chicago Press 1979) (1765–69)) (noting that children were “of two sorts, legitimate, and spurious, or bastards”).
32. See supra note 4.
33. See Mustafa K. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent Theory in
Rape Law Is Turned on Its Head, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 58–59 (2006) (“Today, most jurisdictions have either restricted this marital rape exemption or abolished it.”).
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A right to priority in claiming human remains and to make
anatomical donations on behalf of the deceased spouse
Various inheritance rights, including priority in inheriting the
property of an intestate decedent, the right to a family allowance, and the right to dower
The right for one’s non-American spouse to qualify as an “immediate relative” (i.e., receive preferential immigration treatment) and become an American citizen under federal law
The right to receive additional Social Security benefits based on
the spouse’s contribution
Survivor’s benefits on the death of a veteran spouse 34

It goes without saying that, insofar as gay marriage is illegal in most
states, these rights are denied to same-sex couples unless they can
establish them privately through contract.
2. The Marital Presumption
Marriage also entails the presumption that the husband is the father of the wife’s children. 35 At common law, and in many states by
statute, this presumption was irrebutable. 36 It persisted despite any
evidence to the contrary and, in effect, created a contract theory of
parenthood. If you married a woman, you agreed to be the father of
her child, even if he did not look like you. 37 As with the marriage contract generally, parties were not allowed to alter the terms of the
marital presumption. 38
Traditionally, by agreeing to enter into that status, husband and
wife were agreeing to support and raise any children born to the
marriage. Because husband and wife agreed to raise children, they
were bound to be father and mother, regardless of whether the
children born to the marriage were biologically related. 39

Genetic testing has chipped away at adherence to the marital presumption, and courts and legislatures have begun releasing husbands from their parental status where they have established that

34. ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 66 (footnotes omitted).
35. See Goodright v. Moss, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B.) (stating Lord Mansfield’s Rule presuming that a mother’s husband is the father of all children born to her during the marriage).
36. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–21 (1989) (upholding California’s
“conclusive presumption” that a child born into an intact marriage is the legal child of the
mother’s husband).
37. See id.
38. See Baker, supra note 9, at 12 (“[F]or most intents and purposes, the marital presumption of the husband’s paternity was irrebuttable.”). “Marriage is a contract to be together and regardless of whether the wife was also ‘together’ with someone else, she is still
in a unit with the husband.” Id. at 24.
39. Id. at 25.
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they have no genetic link to their wives’ children. 40 Still, the assumption that the husband is the father persists in the law. 41 The marital
presumption suggests that parentage is more about functioning as a
parent than it is about a biological connection to the child. This is
true at least insofar as being married to a child’s mother suggests the
intent to share her life and help rear her children. Indeed, some
courts have begun to recognize the “de facto parent” doctrine, which
focuses on the fact of acting like a parent rather than on a genetic
link with a child. 42
Broadly speaking, the marital presumption and the de facto parent doctrine both rely on the traditional marriage contract to determine parentage. The former does so explicitly. The latter looks to
marriage as a model: if the relationship looks like a marriage and the
parties are rearing a child together, some courts will infer a parental
relationship. Furthermore, just as the marital contract provides an
example upon which courts have built the de facto parent doctrine,
marriage can also provide an example upon which nontraditional
families can build. But first, they need the right to make changes to
the traditional variety.
C. Modifications to the Marriage Contract
1. Premarital Agreements
The state-defined marriage contract was inflexible until the early
1970s, when courts began recognizing both no-fault divorce and premarital agreements determining property disposition upon divorce,
rather than just upon the death of one spouse. 43 These changes gave
couples some freedom to modify the traditional marriage contract, at
least as it applied to property and finances. Still, the state maintains
control over premarital agreements by engaging in some level of substantive review of their terms instead of taking a hands-off approach
to enforcement, as a court would do with a commercial contract. The
American Law Institute (ALI) explains why this is:
40. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 323, nn.4–5 (2004) (listing cases).
41. See Baker, supra note 9, at n.47 (noting that California has codified the common
law marital presumption and that all states, by statute or common law, have at least a rebuttable presumption that a husband is the father of his wife’s children).
42. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 549–50 (N.J. 2000) (holding that a biological mother’s former partner had standing to seek custody as the children’s “psychological
parent” and listing cases where other courts had recognized such nonbiological parents).
See generally id. at 542–46 (more thoroughly discussing the de facto parent doctrine).
43. See, e.g., Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 111 (W. Va. 1985) (enforcing a premarital
agreement in which the wife waived alimony even though she was not represented by independent counsel); see also Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family
Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 72 (1998) (discussing premarital agreements). See generally
Singer, supra note 25, at 1470–74 (discussing the development of no-fault divorce in law).
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The traditional defenses to enforcement [of premarital contracts]
are justified by two general limitations to the bargain principle
that have particular relevance to premarital agreements. First, the
bargain principle assumes that the parties themselves are the best
judges of their own self-interest, and thus of whether a bargain’s
terms are advantageous to them. . . . Second, the law’s willingness
to enforce a bargain presupposes that it does not contain terms
that violate other important public policies. 44

As to the first limitation, premarital agreements often involve (1)
unrealistic optimism about the future of the relationship and (2) the
tendency to discount the importance of contractual terms that would
apply only in the event of divorce. 45 As to the second limitation, the
ALI envisions that enforcement of premarital agreements is likely to
violate public policy in particular situations, for example, where a
child has been born during the marriage. 46 In these situations, the
ALI recommends that such agreements be reviewed for substantial
injustice, but only when the party resisting enforcement requests
such review. Thus, although under the ALI principles such agreements would receive a more searching review than the standard
commercial contract, there is still room for far more contractual freedom than couples enjoyed prior to the acceptance of such agreements.
The level of review recommended by the ALI for premarital agreements
provides a preview for how courts review family agreements between
same-sex couples. There, too, courts engage in substantive review, although for somewhat different reasons and with different results.
2. Surrogacy Agreements
Surrogacy agreements are controversial, but the law surrounding
these arrangements offers critical guidance for parties attempting to
establish parental status by contract, because a surrogacy agreement
is, in essence, a contract for parental status. If drafted properly, such
agreements should create enforceable parental status. This subpart
discusses the law of surrogacy, how it tends to prefer biological parents to nonbiological parents (at least where one biological relation44. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. a (2002).
45. Id. at 986.
46. Id. at 985. See also id. at § 7.05(2)(a)–(c), recommending that courts should engage in substantive review of such agreements
if, and only if, the party resisting its enforcement shows that one or more of the
following have occurred since the time of the agreement’s execution:
(a) more than a fixed number of years have passed, that number being set in a
rule of statewide application;
(b) a child was born to, or adopted by, the parties, who at the time of execution
had no children in common;
(c) there has been a change in circumstances that has a substantial impact on
the parties or their children, but when they executed the agreement the parties
probably did not anticipate either the change, or its impact.
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ship clearly exists), and how surrogacy agreements should be
treated, as well as how they can be used by parents attempting to
create parental status by contract.
According to the Uniform Parentage Act of 2002, approximately
half of the states have statutory or case law on the legality of surrogacy. 47 About half of those states recognize such agreements, and the
other half reject them. 48 Two cases described below illustrate the major divisions over the issue. 49 There are two types of surrogacy. Traditional surrogacy involves a surrogate woman being inseminated
with a man’s sperm (generally the male member of the couple that
intends to become the child’s parents) and then surrendering her
rights to her genetic child to the intended parents. Traditional surrogacy is more controversial than gestational surrogacy, where an embryo (typically created from the egg and sperm of the couple intending to become parents) is implanted in the surrogate’s womb. In gestational surrogacy, the surrogate is not genetically related to the
child, but a gestational surrogate still has a parental claim to the
child and still must surrender her rights to the child before the intended parents may establish parental status and custody.
Though the law is unsettled, courts seem more willing to enforce
gestational surrogacy agreements than traditional surrogacy agreements. 50 This seems to be because in gestational surrogacy the surrogate is not surrendering rights to her genetic child. In other words,
she is not what we think of as a “biological parent,” even though she
gave birth to the child. This fits with the biological basis for parental
status that pervades much of family law, but, as discussed below, it
works unfairness on nonbiological parents and often ignores the bond
between gestational mother and child.
47. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8, cmt. (amended 2002).
48. See id.
A survey in December, 2000, revealed a wide variety of approaches: eleven
states allow gestational agreements by statute or case law; six states void such
agreements by statute; eight states do not ban agreements per se, but statutorily ban compensation to the gestational mother, which as a practical matter
limits the likelihood of agreement to close relatives; and two states judicially
refuse to recognize such agreements. In states rejecting gestational agreements, the legal status of children born pursuant to such an agreement is uncertain. If gestational agreements are voided or criminalized, individuals determined to become parents through this method will seek a friendlier legal forum. This raises a host of legal issues. For example, a couple may return to
their home state with a child born as the consequence of a gestational agreement recognized in another state. This presents a full faith and credit question if their home state has a statute declaring gestational agreements to be
void or criminal.
Id.; see also J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 12–16 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2004) (discussing the variety in state surrogacy law).
49. Compare Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), with In re Baby M., 537
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
50. See supra note 48.
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(a) Gestational Surrogacy
In the California case Johnson v. Calvert, 51 a married couple entered a contract with a surrogate to carry their genetic embryo (the
husband’s sperm and the wife’s egg) in the surrogate’s womb. 52 When
the baby was born, the surrogate, Anna, tried to renege on the deal,
claiming that she was the “natural” mother. The court found that
“[b]ecause two women each have presented acceptable proof of maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided without enquiring
into the parties’ intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement.” 53 Based on those intentions, the court held that the genetic
parents were to have custody of the child. 54
[The husband and wife] affirmatively intended the birth of the
child, and took the steps necessary to effect in vitro fertilization.
But for their acted-on intention, the child would not exist. Anna
agreed to facilitate the procreation of Mark’s and Crispina’s child.
The parties’ aim was to bring Mark’s and Crispina’s child into the
world, not for Mark and Crispina to donate a zygote to Anna.
Crispina from the outset intended to be the child’s mother. Although the gestative function Anna performed was necessary to
bring about the child’s birth, it is safe to say that Anna would not
have been given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had
she, prior to implantation of the zygote, manifested her own intent
to be the child’s mother. No reason appears why Anna’s later
change of heart should vitiate the determination that Crispina is
the child’s natural mother. 55

Of course, one reason does appear, which explains why Anna’s
later change of heart might vitiate the determination that Crispina is
the child’s “natural mother”: Anna carried the child to term. But instead of addressing whether the gestational mother’s claim might be
superior to the genetic mother’s, the court simply calls the two claims
to motherhood a draw and looks to intent to break the tie. This is the
appropriate outcome of this case, but it is worth considering whether
the genetic connection merits the priority it is often given.
Prioritizing genetics over gestation is another way of prioritizing
biology over conduct. But the gestational mother is intimately connected to the child in a way that a genetics-only mother (or any father) will never be. The gestational mother’s conduct throughout the
pregnancy has a direct impact on the child’s health and well-being.
These considerations no doubt play a large part in the law’s discomfort with surrogacy. But, to the extent that courts explicitly attribute
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

851 P.2d 776 (1993).
Id. at 778.
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id.
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that discomfort to any aspect of surrogacy, they tend to attribute it to
the fact that the surrogate is giving up a child who is not genetically
related to her, not the fact that she is giving up a child with whom
she has shared an intimate prenatal relationship. 56 In other words,
courts tend to emphasize biology (genetics) over conduct (gestation)
in assigning parental rights.
A New York case following Johnson v. Calvert challenges this understanding. Citing Johnson, McDonald v. McDonald 57 held that the
gestational mother, not the egg donor, was the parent because that
was the parties’ manifest intent. 58 McDonald underscored the fact
that Johnson avoided the issue of who has the preferred claim to
motherhood when the gestational mother is not the genetic mother.
Both cases focused instead on the parties’ manifest intentions, and
this focus aligns them with traditional contract doctrine.
But lower California courts have limited the scope of Johnson v.
Calvert to cases where there are multiple claims to a biological relationship, so that biology does not conclusively determine parentage. 59
Where biology is clear (that is, in traditional surrogacy arrangements
where only one woman has a claim as the “natural” mother), such
cases hold that it is unnecessary to look to the parties’ intentions to
determine parenthood. In such cases, biology controls.
(b) Traditional Surrogacy
Likewise, in the famous case of Baby M., 60 biology helped determine the outcome. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a traditional surrogacy agreement was unenforceable. In Baby
M., there was only one biological mother—the surrogate—and she
challenged the agreement after her child was born. The court refused
to terminate the surrogate mother’s parental rights without her consent but still granted custody to the intended parents—the biological
father and his wife—because, the court determined, that was in the
child’s best interests. This case highlights the distinction in the law
between using biology to determine parental status while using the
56. See, e.g., 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 16:22 (4th ed. 1999).
57. 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994).
58. Id. at 480.
59. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (4th Dist. 1994); see
also Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 133–36 (Dist. Ct. App. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, 37 Cal. 4th. 156 (2005) (citing Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1231)
(Johnson does not “endorse contractual stipulations of parentage based on the parties’ intentions without regard to the [California Parentage] Act. In those cases the court looked
at the parties’ intent as a part of the interpretation and application of the Act. Only when
the Act was unclear or yielded an ambiguous result did the courts consider intent to determine parentage.”).
60. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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best-interests analysis to make decisions regarding custody.
The Baby M. court held that the traditional surrogacy agreement
violated state statutes regarding surrender of parental rights and the
state policy of keeping children with their “natural” parents. 61 The
New Jersey statutes governing surrender of parental rights provide
that parental rights cannot be terminated without either a declaration of parental unfitness or voluntary surrender of the child to a
state agency. 62 In the case of voluntary surrender, the law requires
formality: the biological parent must give written consent to ensure
that the surrender is knowing and voluntary and that the biological
parent has received counseling and is well informed about what she
is giving up. None of that formality was present in the surrogacy
agreement at issue in Baby M. But the court was even more concerned
about the role of money in the contract—the court found a profit motive in the agreement that was akin to criminal babyselling. 63
Both of these problematic aspects of the surrogacy agreement—
the lack of formality (which led the court to fear that the agreement
took advantage of a vulnerable woman not fully informed of her
rights) and the profit motive (which violated the state’s policy against
babyselling)—could have been addressed by proper drafting of the
agreement. Why not require such agreements to include provisions
that fully inform the surrogate mother of her rights and ban provisions treating the agreement as a commercial transaction (no premiums allowed)? (This seems to have been the way the contract in
Johnson was written, which may have contributed to the court’s willingness to enforce it.) If the court is willing to operate within the
framework of contract law, there should be little problem with enforcing a surrogacy agreement—particularly one that looks like an
adoption agreement, which is what the contract just described would
look like. To be more specific, such an agreement should be enforceable so long as it fully informs the biological parent of what is involved in terminating her parental rights, it does not pay a premium
for termination of rights, and it provides for a window after the baby
is born during which the parent can change her mind.
But the court in Baby M. was not willing to operate within the
contract framework (perhaps primarily because of the problems with
the contract in question). The court was also concerned about upholding New Jersey’s public policy of keeping children with their natural
61. Id. at 1243.
62. See id. (“Our statutes, and the cases interpreting them, leave no doubt that where
there has been no written surrender to an approved agency or to DYFS, termination of parental rights will not be granted in this state absent a very strong showing of abandonment or neglect. . . . It is clear that a ‘best interests’ determination is never sufficient to
terminate parental rights; the statutory criteria must be proved.”).
63. See id. at 1240.
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parents. 64 Again, when the question is one of parental status (as opposed to custody), the court relies on biology, not conduct or parental
intent. The court’s explanation for this policy focused on the emotional drama of the case at hand (and the “tug-of-war” between the
biological parents) without discussing the theoretical underpinnings
of the law’s preference for biological parents. Indeed, the court’s primary concern seemed to be the defects in the surrogacy agreement,
which, as discussed above, are solvable through careful drafting.
(c) ”Surrogacy” Without Technology
The above cases involved the use of reproductive technology, such
as in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination. In the absence of
such technology, courts are even less likely to enforce a surrogacy
agreement that cuts against a biological relationship with a child.
For example, Budnick v. Silverman 65 held that a contract between a
“sperm donor” and an infertile couple was unenforceable because the
sperm was donated “the old-fashioned way,” without the assistance
of reproductive technology. 66 The sperm donor was allowed to assert
his parental rights despite the existence of a preconception agreement signing away those rights. 67 Still, it is important to note that
biology does not always carry the day, even when only one parent can
claim a biological relationship. In N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 68 the wife/mother
conceived a child out of wedlock and the biological father sued to
have his paternity established.69 Rather than rule conclusively that fatherhood is determined either by biology or by a marital relationship
with the mother, the appellate court remanded with instructions that a
best-interests-of-the-child analysis should determine legal paternity. 70
The uncertainty in surrogacy law (and, in particular, its tendency
to rely on biology in assigning parental status) creates unfair distinctions among parents. Only couples who can afford in vitro fertilization of their own embryo in a gestational surrogate’s womb have a
64. See id. at 1246–47 (“The surrogacy contract guarantees permanent separation of
the child from one of its natural parents. Our policy, however, has long been that to the extent
possible, children should remain with and be brought up by both of their natural parents.”).
65. 805 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
66. Id. at 1114.
67. Id.
Florida courts have held that agreements relieving a parent of the duty to support are void as against public policy. . . . The rights of support and meaningful
relationship belong to the child, not the parent; therefore, neither parent can
bargain away those rights. . . .
. . . The total abdication of parental responsibility present in the instant Preconception Agreement cannot be said to protect the best interests of the child.
Id. at 113–14.
68. 9 P.3d 354 (Colo. 2000).
69. Id. at 357-58.
70. See id. at 362.
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(relatively) good chance of having their surrogacy agreements enforced. Those who can only afford traditional surrogacy and couples
where one member is sterile likely will not receive the same protection for their agreements.
This distinction works the greatest unfairness among gay couples—gay men, in particular. Whereas lesbian couples potentially
can have the egg of one (fertilized by the sperm of an anonymous donor) implanted in the womb of the other, such that both women have
a biological claim to parenthood, gay men must rely on a third party
to carry their child. Even if they use an anonymous egg donor, so
that the gestational mother cannot claim a genetic relationship,
courts likely will grant parental rights to that gestational mother if
she reneges on a surrogacy agreement. 71 Her rights as a gestational
mother, though perhaps deemed inferior (or at best equal) to the
rights of a genetic mother, will trump the rights of intended parents
with no biological connection at all.
D. Private Ordering of Family Relationships
When unmarried couples use contract to attempt to create family
ties that are as tight as those created by marriage, courts tend to
leave objective contract theory and engage in substantive review of
contract terms, with widely varying outcomes. Whether considering
an implied contract for parental rights between same-sex partners,
an equitable claim to such rights by the nonbiological parent in a
custody dispute, or an express agreement between partners, courts,
on average, tend to disregard the preconception intent of the parties
and favor the biological parent. Even where courts nominally follow
the intent of the parties, they do so only where it is in the best interests of the child, as determined by the court, thus conflating the rules
for establishing parental status with those for determining custody.
1. Establishing Parental Status by Statute
Theoretically, there could be no legal difference between someone
who establishes parental status by procreating and someone who establishes parental status by contract, where all else between them is
the same. This is controversial. Many argue that nonbiological parents are incapable of the same attachments that biological parents

71. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 22–24 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (holding a
gestational surrogacy agreement void as against public policy because it did not provide for
a legal mother and it allowed the parties to bargain away the children’s custody and support rights and finding gestational mother to be the legal mother because of her actions as
a parent); see also Jaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 701 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding
where neither intended parent had a biological connection to the child, surrogate mother probably could have challenged the surrogacy agreement to retain her parental rights).
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have with their children. But generally speaking, we do not question
the love that adoptive parents have for their children. And we do not
question the fact that many biological parents do not intend to become parents or are bad parents. This Article merely attempts to put
contractual parents on the same footing as biological and adoptive
parents. It does not intend to denigrate the fierce attachments
that biological parents have to their children. It does, however,
argue that nonbiological parents may have the same fierce attachments to their children.
But the law treats these parents very differently. Statutorily, the
law generally recognizes only two kinds of legal parents: natural parents and adoptive parents. 72 Biological parents may petition courts to
establish parentage without a best-interests analysis. 73 In other
words, a biological parent may establish parental status even if it is
not in the child’s best interests. Adoptive parents, however, are not
awarded parental status without a searching inquiry into whether
they would make good parents. 74 Furthermore, the revised Uniform
Parentage Act calls for recognition of gestational surrogacy agreements only and allows for establishment of parental status under
such agreements where those agreements have been validated by a
court. 75 Many states that recognize surrogacy agreements similarly
limit the establishment of parental status to intended parents who
are biologically related to the child. 76

72. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973) (“As used in this Act, ‘parent and child relationship’ means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive
parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship.”).
Several states have adopted language similar to that of the uniform statute. See, e.g., 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1 (West 2006).
73. See J.S.A. v. M.H., 797 N.E.2d 705, 708–09 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that the
court was statutorily prohibited from conducting a best-interests hearing to determine
whether the adjudication of parentage was in the child’s best interests).
74. Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/11 (2006) (providing for a court determination of
parentage based only on biology), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/20a (2006) (“The best interests and welfare of the person being adopted shall be of paramount consideration in the
construction and interpretation of [the Adoption Act].”); see also Steven N. Peskind, Who’s
Your Daddy?: An Analysis of Illinois’ Law of Parentage and the Meaning of Parenthood, 35
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 811, 815-16 (2004) (“Pervasive notions of children’s interests that permeate the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and the Adoption Act are conspicuously absent from statutory provisions that determine who should be afforded the opportunity to parent a child.”) (citations omitted).
75. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (amended 2002) (providing for recognition of gestational surrogacy agreements); id. art. 6 (granting standing to maintain a parentage proceeding to intended parents under a gestational agreement authorized by article 8).
76. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45/6 (2007).
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2. Implied Contracts and Equitable Doctrines: The De Facto
Parent
Some courts have held that nonbiological parents may assert at
least limited parenting rights by virtue of having acted as a “psychological parent” or “de facto parent” of the child. De facto parent cases
invoke equitable and implied-contract theories similar to those first
recognized in Marvin v. Marvin, 77 which held in part that “[i]n the
absence of an express contract, the courts should inquire into the
conduct of the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract, agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties.” 78 Often
in de facto parent cases, the nonbiological parent is simply granted
standing to sue for custody, not full parental status. 79 These cases
seem to fragment what it means to be a parent, granting some rights
but not full parental status to the nonbiological parent. In some
sense, then, these cases challenge what it means to be a parent in the
first place. The same thing arguably happens in a custody dispute
between biological parents, but there, neither parent has the lack of
a biological connection acting as a strike against custody. Some
would argue that parenting is more of an all-or-nothing proposition
and that splitting up the bundle of parenting rights as though they
were property rights violates due process. 80
Where a court does grant parental status to a de facto parent, it
may fall back on biology to do so. This Part analyzes a variety of de
facto parent cases—both those that do and do not adopt the doctrine
of the de facto parent—and then discusses how the de facto parent
doctrine supports this Article’s argument for enforcing contracts that
establish parental status.

77. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
78. Id. at 110.
79. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Olivia J., 84 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1152 (Ct. App.
2000) (holding that the former same-sex partner of a biological mother could file a petition
for guardianship of the mother’s child); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that a former same-sex partner had standing, as a psychological parent, to petition for equal parenting time after the relationship ended, even though the former partner
had no legal relationship to the child or the mother); King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965 (Ind.
2005) (holding former same-sex partner not necessarily precluded from being awarded parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the biological mother’s child, conceived
through artificial insemination during the parties’ domestic relationship); Gestl v. Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (finding that the biological mother’s former
same-sex partner had standing to bring a custody suit under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act because she held herself out to others as the child’s parent); C.E.W. v.
D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004) (holding that the former partner of a biological mother
was entitled to be considered for an award of parental rights and responsibilities where the
trial court found that she was the child’s de facto parent).
80. See generally Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 662–63 (2002)
(discussing parental rights and the Due Process Clause).
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An unusually pertinent example of the de facto parent doctrine is
in K.M. v. E.G. 81 There, the California Supreme Court recognized
that two women who had formerly been a lesbian couple—one of
whom donated her ova to be fertilized and implanted into the womb
of the other—were the parents of twins born to them. 82 The women
disputed what they had agreed upon regarding parental rights prior
to conceiving the twins. 83 E.G., the gestational mother, claimed they
agreed that she would be the sole parent and that she had only
agreed to be implanted with K.M.’s ova on the condition that K.M. relinquish her parental rights. 84 An ova donor consent form signed by
K.M., which explicitly stated she was relinquishing all rights in any
child conceived, supports this view. 85 K.M., on the other hand,
claimed they agreed to raise the children together and that she only
read the donor consent form minutes before signing it (and only
signed it because she thought it was a formality required before donating her eggs). 86 The couple’s later conduct—they lived together
with the children, and both women supported the children 87 —
supports this view.
In reaching its decision that both women were parents, the court
relied on Johnson v. Calvert, the in vitro fertilization case discussed
above, 88 and on provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act regarding
presumptions of paternity. The court concluded that “ ‘genetic consanguinity’ could be the basis for a finding of maternity just as it is
for paternity.” 89 Thus, the court relied in part on the biological relationship between K.M. (the ova donor) and the children and in part
on the parties’ conduct after the twins were born, treating this conduct as a sort of implied intent. There was considerable evidence that
K.M., the genetic mother, had acted for years as a de facto parent, although neither of the women revealed to family and friends that she
was genetically related to them. 90
Before the twins were born, some friends held a baby shower
honoring both E.G. and K.M. After the birth, E.G. and K.M., as a
couple, received other congratulatory cards and gifts. But E.G.
never revealed to her friends or family that K.M. was the egg donor. Nor did K.M. disclose that she was genetically related to the

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
Id. at 680–81.
Id. at 679.
See id.
See id. at 676.
See id.
See id. at 676–77.
See infra Part I.C.2.a.
K.M., 117 P.3d at 678 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781–82 (1993)).
See K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 141–42 (Ct. App. 2004).
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children, even though the children came to refer to K.M.’s parents
as “Granny” and “Papa.”
. . . E.G. listed K.M. as a “co-parent” on the school enrollment
forms. However, it was E.G. who signed the enrollment forms and
paid the preschool tuition. Both E.G. and K.M. took the children to
pediatric appointments. However, they never revealed to the children’s pediatrician that K.M. was genetically related to the girls.
. . . K.M. and E.G. then continued to live together until August
2001, when E.G. moved with the girls to Massachusetts. E.G.
listed K.M. as a parent on the Massachusetts school forms. K.M.
and E.G. each paid half the tuition for the Massachusetts school. 91

The court distinguished this case from the true egg donation case
where the donor is not known by the intended parents and has no
later relationship to the child. 92 The reasoning here seems to be, if it
looks like a family and acts like a family, we’re going to treat it as a
family. Of course, this reasoning ignores whether K.M. and E.G. subjectively wanted to be a family. But, from a contracts point of view,
that might be justifiable: the facts regarding intent were in dispute,
so the court looked to the objective manifestation of intent, namely
that K.M. and E.G. were raising the children in their home as parents. That, coupled with K.M.’s genetic relationship to the children,
was enough to call her a parent. Of course, this objective manifestation of intent assumes there is general agreement on what counts as
a family, which is admittedly a big assumption. In both K.M. and
Johnson, the courts seem driven to create family units with two parents. Johnson looked to the parties’ intent to create a family composed of a married couple and a baby; K.M. looked to biology and the
conduct of the parties to create a family composed of two mothers and
their babies. E.G. might argue that it’s unnecessary for children to
have two parents, if that’s not what the parties wanted in the first
place. But K.M. might respond that E.G.’s conduct suggests otherwise.
From a strictly contractarian perspective, it may be impossible for
a court to determine the actual terms of agreement or even whether
there was a meeting of the minds at all, when facts are as heavily
disputed as they are in K.M. Indeed, K.M. reversed a decision by the
California Court of Appeal, which had ruled in favor of the gestational mother. The lower court had based its decision on the ova donor consent form K.M. had signed, relinquishing her parental rights
to the twins. The lower court’s decision prioritized the ova donor

91. Id.
92. K.M., 117 P.3d at 679 (“Thus, even accepting as true E.G.’s version of the facts
(which the superior court did), the present case, like Johnson, does not present a ‘true “egg
donation” ’ situation. K.M. did not intend to simply donate her ova to E.G., but rather provided her ova to her lesbian partner with whom she was living so that E.G. could give birth
to a child that would be raised in their joint home.”) (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782).
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form—an express agreement—over the implied agreement between
the couple to raise the children together. The supreme court’s opinion
represents the better view. The terms of the ova donor form were
ambiguous as applied to these parties, because K.M. was not an
anonymous donor. The later conduct between the parties spoke more
strongly of an implied agreement to be parents.
In Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 93 the court rejected an express parenting agreement between the parties but established parenting rights in the nonbiological parent anyway based on the presumed parent doctrine (which is equivalent to the de facto parent
doctrine). 94 The presumed parent doctrine, codified in the California
Family Code, 95 was drafted to address issues of uncertain paternity—
its purpose was to establish paternity in one who takes a child into
his home and openly holds out the child as his own. Cases like
Kristine Renee H. have held that the presumption applies to women
as well as men, based on a gender-neutral reading of the statute.
Thus, a presumption that was intended to track biology (much like
the marital presumption—if you’re holding out a child as your own,
chances are that child is your own) was extended to cover de facto
parents, regardless of biology.
In rejecting a parenting agreement but finding parental status
based on the presumed parent doctrine, Kristine Renee H. represents
a clear preference by the California courts: they prefer to take the
time to investigate the conduct of the parties rather than to defer to a
contract between them. Perhaps this represents the wise use of caution in a new area of law—that regarding reproductive technology.
But this judicial preference for hands-on decision making can also be
seen as encroachment: it brings parental status cases involving de
facto parents within the realm of the best-interests doctrine. As they
do in custody cases, family courts are imposing their own norms on
de facto parent cases, rather than leaving things to the parents
themselves as they tend to do in parentage cases where biological
parents are involved.
In a larger number of cases, however, courts have ignored any implied contract between the parties and declined to invoke equitable doctrines in favor of the nonbiological parent. Often, these

93. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Ct. App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 117 P.3d 690 (Cal.
2005). Kristine Renee H. is also discussed in Part I.D.3, infra, which addresses judicial acceptance of express parenting agreements.
94. Kristine Renee H. distinguished Johnson v. Calvert (which, you will recall from the
previous Part, upheld a parenting agreement where biology was ambiguous) in holding
that, where biology is clear, there can be no resort to a contract for parenting rights. 16
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 133–34; see also supra Part I.C.2.
95. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2006).
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courts find that there is no statutory authority to grant rights to a
same-sex parent. 96
For example, in State ex rel D.R.M., 97 the biological mother’s partner left her shortly before she discovered their efforts at artificial insemination had been successful. The D.R.M. court held that the expartner was not a parent because she was not biologically related to
the child and had not adopted the child. 98 The court declined to create an “intended parent” or “partial parent” who would owe child
support but not gain any other parental rights. 99 This case contrasts
sharply with K.M. v. E.G. This case also diverges from those in which
the de facto parent doctrine is used to fragment parenting rights. 100
The court held strictly to the statutory requirements for establishing
parental status. D.R.M. explained that the outcome would have been
the same if the ex-partner were a man not married to the mother or a
stepparent who later divorced the mother. 101 The court rejected a
promissory estoppel claim by the biological mother because it found
that both parties had understood that for the ex-partner to have any
rights, the arrangement would have had to proceed to an adoption. 102
The exchange had to be completed on both sides. No adoption meant
no child support. Furthermore, the court concluded that the biological mother would have had the child with or without the ex-partner,
so there was no reliance. 103
In T.F. v. B.L., 104 the Massachusetts court held that there was an
implied contract between the mother and her former domestic partner, but that the contract was unenforceable because
[t]he decision to become, or not to become, a parent is a personal
right of “such delicate and intimate character that direct enforcement . . . by any process of the court should never be attempted.”
“Parenthood by contract” is not the law in Massachusetts, and, to

96. See, e.g., Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding
an alleged psychological parent lacked a parental status equivalent to a biological mother
and was not entitled to custody or visitation over the objection of the biological mother);
Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-137, 1997 WL 467327, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (affirming
the dismissal of a nonbiological mother’s complaint for child support and motion for temporary visitation). But see Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 671–72 (Cal. 2005) (overturning Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990) and holding that there is statutory authority under the Uniform Parentage Act to grant rights to a same-sex parent).
97. 34 P.3d 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
98. Id. at 891–92.
99. Id. at 894.
100. See infra notes 79–89 and accompanying text.
101. D.R.M., 34 P.2d at 893–94.
102. Id. at 897; cf. K.M. v. E.G., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 66 (Ct. App. 2005) (disregarding
E.G.’s claim that the couple agreed she would be the sole parent unless K.M. eventually
adopted the children). K.M. may have implicitly granted a promissory estoppel claim to
parenthood based on the fact that K.M. had treated E.G.’s children as her own for years.
103. D.R.M., 34 P.2d at 897.
104. 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004).
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the extent the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement, express or implied, to coparent a child, that agreement
is unenforceable. 105

The court, emphasizing that the result would have been the same
if the couple were heterosexual, declined to invoke its equitable powers to create a duty requiring the former domestic partner to pay
child support. 106 The court, in denying parenthood by contract, ignored the fact that a marriage contract often creates a parenting contract, as discussed in Part I.A.2 of this Article.
Likewise, in McGuffin v. Overton, 107 a case involving a dispute as
to the custody of a child whose biological mother had died, the court
awarded custody to the child’s biological father and held that the
mother’s same-sex partner lacked standing to seek custody, despite
the mother’s expressed wishes that the partner be named the child’s
guardian and the fact that the biological parents were never married. 108 The mother had executed a will which purported to make her
partner the guardian of her children. 109 The will stated that the
mother did not want the father named as guardian because he had
failed to establish a relationship with the children. 110 Furthermore,
at the time of the mother’s death, the father’s support obligation regarding the children was approximately $20,000 in arrears. 111 In the
father’s defense, it could be asked why he had been ordered to pay
child support if he had never developed a relationship with the child
and had never been married to the mother. Moreover, granting custody to the mother’s partner without terminating the father’s parental status would have been constitutionally questionable. 112 The court,
however, stressed that the legislature had been very specific in limiting those third persons who were permitted to bring an action for custody, and the partner came within none of the statutory classes. 113
This Article’s argument that parties should be allowed to contract
for parental status draws somewhat on the de facto parent doctrine.
The de facto parent doctrine is a basic contract doctrine about protecting expectations and reliance based on implicit private agreements. 114 The de facto parent is recognized as a parent because his or
her conduct manifests an intent to be a parent and that conduct has
created expectations and reliance on the part of the child and the
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1251 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1252–53.
542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 289–92.
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 62–63 (2000).
McGuffin, 542 N.W.2d at 291–92.
See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
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other parent. 115 If courts are willing to grant standing to de facto parents to sue for custody—a right typically reserved to those with parenting status established by biology or adoption—then courts should
also enforce contracts explicitly establishing such status.
Of course, the courts that reject the de facto parent doctrine often
do so precisely because they also do not allow anyone but a biological
or an adoptive parent to petition for custody. 116 These courts do not
want to create “partial parents,” who may have a right to custody or
a responsibility to pay support but not full parental rights. 117 This
position makes sense, insofar as it makes parenting an all-or-nothing
bargain. But it ignores the bargain. Biological and adoptive parents
engage in bargaining over parental status just as much as nonbiological parents. Biological parents enter a marriage contract before conception, or else they petition a court to declare parentage. 118
Adoptive parents enter an adoption agreement that terminates
rights in the birth mother and establishes rights in the adoptive parents, based on specified conditions.
As demonstrated by Kristine Renee H., California family courts
have expressed a preference for the de facto parent doctrine over enforcement of explicit parenting agreements. But within the rubric of
contract law, explicit parenting agreements should be preferred. Express agreements save the court (and the parties) time and energy.
Instead of going through the effort (and potentially difficult issues of
proof) of establishing that someone is a de facto parent, enforcing
parenting agreements would allow the court to simply refer to a contract, which, if drafted properly, would leave no doubt about who a
child’s parents are. Furthermore, a policy of enforcing express
agreements but not implied agreements would create an incentive for
parents to be clear about their wishes and to draft a formal agreement reflecting those wishes.
There is an argument against this proposal: determining parentage is tricky business, and courts should not be quick to leave it to
contract. They should handle these cases carefully and exercise their
discretion to make thoughtful, individualized decisions. But who does
that help? It leaves the law indeterminate, and it takes decisions out
of the hands of those best able to make them—parents. Major corporations would not be happy to leave the interpretation of their critical agreements to the ad hoc decision making of a court. Corporations
115. See id.
116. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing D.R.M.).
117. See id.
118. A court declaration of parentage may be the furthest of these examples from traditional notions of contract, but a court declaration does establish a form of contractual relations between parents: the right to have a parental relationship with the child is granted
in exchange for taking on responsibilities for that child.
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enjoy the benefit of the business judgment rule, which acknowledges
that directors and officers tend to know best what is in the interest of
their companies. 119 Parents should be no happier to have a court
make critical decisions regarding their children; at least as to the
question of parentage, they should be similarly expected to know
what is in the best interests of their children. Admittedly, when the
relationship between parents breaks down, often parents are unable
to reach sensible decisions about custody, and it may be necessary for
a court to step in and make the best impartial decision it can make.
But, if those parents have in place an ex ante agreement about their
status as parents, at least that agreement should be honored in the
best-interests analysis.
3. Express Parenting Agreements
Several courts have held that parenting agreements between a legal/biological parent and a nonbiological parent are unenforceable.
But some courts have enforced such agreements—if the agreement
was in the child’s best interests. Once again, this conflates the issue of
parenting status (which should be free from best-interests considerations) with the issue of custody and visitation (which is, for better or
worse, based on best interests). This Part discusses two cases, one
where an express agreement was found to be unenforceable, and one
where such an agreement was enforced.
(a) Not Enforceable
As discussed in the previous Part, in Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa
Ann R., 120 the court ruled that it could not accept the parties’ stipulation as a basis for entering a judgment regarding parental status. “A
determination of parentage cannot rest simply on the parties’ agreement.” 121 However, the court found that it could determine parentage
under the Uniform Parentage Act, so that although resort to contract
failed, the court’s gender-neutral reading of the relevant statute
achieved the same goal as enforcement of the parties’ parenting
agreement would have. “While such a conclusion under the Act may
not be a result that the Legislature expressly contemplated, the Act
does mandate that we read the provisions in a gender-neutral manner and that mandate compels our conclusion.” 122

119. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d
Cir. 1986) (“[A] presumption of propriety inures to the benefit of directors.”).
120. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005).
121. Id. at 126.
122. Id. (footnote omitted).
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(b) Enforceable
Davis v. Kania 123 appears to be something of an anomaly in this
area, at least for the time being. The Connecticut court recognized
and enforced an agreement establishing two men as the legal parents
of a child conceived via artificial insemination from the sperm of one
of the men and the egg of a surrogate. 124 Relying on an earlier case,
the court found that “ ‘the egg donor agreement and the gestational
carrier agreement [were] valid, enforceable, irrevocable and of full legal
effect’ under the laws of the state of Connecticut.”125 The court appears
not to have conditioned enforcement of the contract on a best-interests
analysis. Instead, it simply enforced the intent of the parties.
III. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
This Part describes the best-interests standard. It then discusses
how the standard has operated to deprive gay parents of their parental rights, both where a gay biological parent is in a dispute with a
straight parent and where a gay nonbiological parent is in a dispute
with a gay biological parent. It discusses the different forms the bestinterests standard can take when applied to gay parents, particularly
the “per se rule” and the “nexus rule,” and it addresses how the bestinterests standard has been used to trump private agreements between same-sex partners. Finally, this Part discusses the law of second-parent adoption, the only sure way for nonbiological parents to
secure parental rights in the biological children of their partners.
A. The Best-Interests Standard
The child’s best interests are the primary consideration in custody
determinations (as opposed to determinations of parental status),
and judges have broad discretion in determining what those interests
are. 126 There are good reasons for instituting the best-interests doctrine: where parents cannot agree, it may be necessary for an impartial judge to make custody and visitation decisions regarding the
child. Perhaps more important, the best-interests doctrine can be justified as a protection against third-party harms (the child being the

123. 836 A.2d 480 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003).
124. Id. at 483.
125. Id. (quoting Vogel v. Kirkbride, No. FA 02-024718505, 2002 WL 34119315 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2002)).
126. See, e.g., Patrick v. Byerley, 325 S.E.2d 99, 100–01 (Va. 1985) (holding that a
child’s best interests would be served by his remaining in the care of his stepmother instead of his biological mother and awarding her custody on that basis); see also ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 913 (4th ed. 2000) (noting
that the best interest of the child is the primary consideration and that judges have broad
discretion in custody cases).
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third party) inflicted by parents’ otherwise private decisions. 127 But
in each case it is important to ask, what is the harm prevented? Secondarily, we must ask whether the best-interests doctrine has the
potential to cause more harm than it prevents. This Article just
touches the surface of these questions. 128
The best-interests standard replaced the “maternal-preference”
standard for awarding custody in the 1970s. 129 It was meant to be a
neutral replacement for the gender inequalities inherent in the maternal-preference standard, but the best-interests standard is indeterminate and largely standardless. Indeed, the best-interests standard
is so malleable that at least one commentator has argued, contrary to
the position taken in this Article, that the best-interests standard is being used to protect the parenting rights of same-sex parents.130
The best-interests standard has been adopted by statutes in all
fifty states. 131 The statutes include either lists of relevant factors for
a judge to consider in deciding what is in the best interests of the
child or a general directive to courts. A typical example is Alaska’s
Judgments for Custody Statute. 132 The statute states that
In determining the best interests of the child the court shall consider:
(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of
the child;
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs;
(3) the child’s preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a preference;
(4) the love and affection existing between the child and each
parent;
127. Protecting third parties is a bedrock tenet of liberal thought. See JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859) (“The only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others.”).
128. The “harm” contemplated in this context typically centers around notions of morality (for example, whether it is moral to enter contracts regarding children and whether
it is moral to rear children in a household headed by a gay couple) and the fear of the slippery slope (whether marriage and family can survive the kind of expansion contemplated
by articles like this one). And surely individual liberty must be balanced with—and at
times give way to—the needs of society, which include the need to impose some public
“morals” (for example, thou shalt not kill) on individuals. “But it does not follow that everything to which the moral vetoes of accepted morality attach is of equal importance to society; nor is there the slightest reason for thinking of morality as a seamless web: one which
will fall to pieces carrying society with it, unless all its emphatic vetoes are enforced by
law.” H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 83, 85 (R.M.
Dworkin ed., 1977).
129. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 168–69 (1992).
130. See Dahlia Lithwick, Family Fuse, SLATE, Mar. 11, 2006, www.slate.com/id/2137879.
131. See Theresa E. Ellis, Loved and Lost: Breathing Life into the Rights of Noncustodial Parents, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 276 n.45 (2005).
132. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (2004).
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(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child, except that the court may not consider this willingness and ability if one parent shows that the other parent has
sexually assaulted or engaged in domestic violence against the
parent or a child, and that a continuing relationship with the other
parent will endanger the health or safety of either the parent or
the child;
(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of violence
between the parents;
(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other
members of the household directly affects the emotional or physical well-being of the child;
(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent. 133

The final factor in this list opens the door to consideration of anything the judge deems relevant, including homosexuality. Most individual factors (including homosexuality), in most cases, are not per
se determinative, unless they adversely affect the child. 134
Potentially complicating matters further, courts often rely heavily
on the expert testimony of a social worker and/or the report and recommendation of a guardian ad litem (GAL) in determining the child’s
best interests. 135 The GAL may be an attorney appointed to represent
the child, in which case he or she would present arguments, not tes133. Id. (emphasis added); see also MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 913 n.92
(citing an empirical study of cases in which judges generally relied on ten major factors
with forty-three subfactors deemed important in determining children’s best interests).
134. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 919, 927, 929–31.
135. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 207 S.E.2d 378, 380 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (allowing the testimony of a social worker notwithstanding the contention of the children’s mother that the
testimony should have been disallowed because the social worker spent only two hours in
the home).
[T]he GAL’s report is based on subjective conclusions, dependent to a great extent on the quality and training of that individual. In Vermont, GALs are volunteers. There are no specific qualifications necessary for appointment, and
GAL training is inconsistent among the courts. Their work is performed without supervision, and there is no review of the factors that they consider in recommending custody. When GALs were surveyed by the Gender Bias Task
Force about the attitudes they bring to their work, the task force found that (1)
there is a significant amount of gender bias among the GALs surveyed; (2) in
custody cases, many GALs are not following applicable law in formulating
their recommendations and are considering impermissible factors; and (3)
judges rely heavily upon the recommendations of guardians.
Gilbert v. Gilbert, 664 A.2d 239, 242 n.2 (Vt. 1995) (citing VT. SUPREME COURT & VT. BAR
ASS’N, GENDER AND JUSTICE: REPORT OF THE VERMONT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE LEGAL SYSTEM, 199–200 (1991); see Patty Nelson, How to Be a Guardian Ad Litem in
Minor
Guardianships,
ILLINOIS
PRO
BONO,
July
27,
2006,
http://www.illinoisprobono.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp_content&contentID=2688.
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timony, to the court. There is considerable confusion and disagreement over the proper role of the attorney GAL. 136 Such experts and
advocates are not subject to the rules of evidence in their investigations, and they often conduct their investigations on an ex parte basis. 137 The court, however, does retain discretion to disregard the testimony/argument of such witnesses/advocates if it is contradicted by
that of other witnesses or evidence. 138 Still, in cases involving samesex parents there is a nontrivial danger that the biases of a child representative will lead to a recommendation that the biological parent,
not his or her same-sex partner, deserves custody of their children.
B. A Different Best-Interests Standard for Gay Parents
The best-interests standard looks different when it is applied to
gay parents. 139 Three tests have developed in this area: the so-called
“per se rule,” the “nexus rule,” and a rule shifting the burden of proof
of fitness to the homosexual parent. The tests were developed in the
context of determining custody and visitation rights (not parental
status) between a gay biological parent and a straight biological parent, but, as established in the previous Part, courts often apply the
best-interests standard in establishing parental status as well. The
per se rule, which is disappearing from the case law, explicitly assumes a parent’s homosexuality will have a negative effect on a child.
The nexus rule, though arguably a step in the right direction away
from the per se rule, implicitly suggests that, if a parent’s homosexuality has any effect on a child, that effect will be negative. The burden-shifting rule also assumes that a parent’s homosexuality will be
detrimental to a child and forces the gay parent to prove otherwise.
Thus, even where the gay parent is also the biological parent, the
best-interests standard has been applied differently depending on
sexual orientation.

136. See generally, e.g., Emily Buss, “You’re My What?” The Problem of Children’s Misperceptions of Their Lawyers’ Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699 (1996).
137. See, e.g., Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. REV.
265, 285–86 (2006).
138. See, e.g., Fritschler v. Fritschler, 208 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Wis. 1973) (holding that
the recommendations of a social worker are not mandatory); see also Goodman v. Goodman, 141 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Neb. 1966) (“Hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice, and the
hopes and fears of social workers should not be the basis for a change of custody” and
“[f]indings of fact must rest on a preponderance of evidence, the verity of which has been
carefully and legally tested.”).
139. See, e.g., Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring specially) (concurring in the denial of custody to a lesbian mother on the ground that
“[h]omosexual conduct is . . . abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a
violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God . . . . It is an inherent evil against which
children must be protected.”).
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1. The Per Se Rule
Early custody cases involving gay parents followed a “per se” rule
against custody “based on the ‘immorality’ of the . . . ‘lifestyle.’ ”140
The per se rule states that a parent’s homosexual orientation is per
se detrimental to the child. A seminal case in this area granted custody to a lesbian mother and her partner, but only on the condition
that the couple not live together. 141 As it is applied today, the per se
rule does not always make homosexuality an outright bar to custody
or visitation, as its name implies, but instead counts homosexuality
as a factor against the gay parent. Although this rule is now followed
by only a minority of courts, 142 courts have followed some form of this
rule as recently as 2001. 143
2. The Burden-Shifting Rule
A modern manifestation of the per se rule is found in Bowen v.
Bowen, 144 which shifted the burden to the allegedly gay parent to
prove no adverse impact upon the child from the parent’s homosexuality. 145 In that case, the court separated two brothers, awarding custody of one to the father and of the other to the mother, based on
the determination that one of the boys would not be able to handle
the stigma from rumors that his mother was a homosexual. The
court reasoned:
Based on what I heard Jeremy has been really hurt by the socalled rumors. And whether the relationship is true or not true, it’s
still hurting these children. And I realize that anybody can go out

140. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
832 (Found. Press 1997) (citing Bennett v. Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1973)); see Immerman v. Immerman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301 (Ct. App. 1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379, 381–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952).
141. See Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130, 131, 133 (Wash. 1978).
142. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Family Law, Am. Bar Ass’n, A White Paper: An
Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 360 n.68 (2004) [hereinafter White Paper] (listing cases).
143. See, e.g., Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (modifying custody in
favor of the father and declaring a preference for the father’s heterosexual marriage to the
mother’s same-sex relationship); Taylor v. Taylor, 47 S.W.3d 222, 223, 226 (Ark. 2001) (affirming a restriction that allowed a mother custody only if she did not live in a house with
her same-sex partner or have the partner as an overnight guest). But see Hodson v. Moore,
464 N.W.2d 699, 700–02 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990), which granted custody to a homosexual
mother but stated,
While we do not find a discreet homosexual relationship to be a per se
bar against a mother’s custody, we do find the behavior of those sharing a custodial parent’s home an important factor in continuing that
custody and if that behavior can be found to harm the child, the
child’s interests would require either curtailment of the harmful
situation or a change of custody.
144. 688 So. 2d 1374 (Miss. 1997).
145. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 918–19.
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anywhere and as counsel alluded to the Salem witch trials three
hundred years ago, people can start rumors on anybody [sic.] And
it’s a hard thing to overcome once it’s started. And I realize that.
But in this case I think Linda could have and I think Linda should
have done something to alleviate those rumors even if it was cutting off her relationship with Lynn. 146

3. The Nexus Rule
The “nexus rule,” followed by the majority of courts, 147 creates a
presumption in favor of custody or visitation for the gay parent, rebuttable by a showing that there is a nexus between the gay parent’s
lifestyle and harm to the child. 148 Courts disagree on the degree of
harm necessary to remove a child from a gay parent’s custody. Some
courts hold that the social stigma of living with a gay parent is a sufficient harm, whereas other courts hold that taunting by the child’s
peers is not enough of a harm to deny custody. 149 The cases denying
custody or visitation based on the nexus rule tend to be older cases. 150
However, even recent nexus opinions, which are written as though
they are progressive and, indeed, do have positive results for many
gay parents, still allow consideration of a parent’s homosexuality
within the best-interests analysis, despite the fact that numerous
studies have concluded that homosexuality has no relevant impact on
parenting abilities. 151 These cases suggest implicitly that homosexu146. Bowen, 688 So. 2d at 1381.
147. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 919.
148. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (Mass. 1980) (holding that there
must be a specific showing of harm to the child, exclusive of general cultural prejudice, to
justify depriving a lesbian or gay parent of custody).
149. Compare Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that a
child should be free from taunting by his peers), and S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980) (accepting as a fact that the mother’s lesbian lifestyle “forces on the child a
need for secrecy and the isolation imposed by such a secret, thus separating the child from
his or her peers”), with M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1261–63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979) (finding that taunting by peers is not enough to deny custody). Consider Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–34 (1984), holding that private biases and the injury they might
inflict were impermissible considerations under the Equal Protection Clause for denying
custody to a biological mother who had remarried a man of a different race.
150. See, e.g., N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. 1980) (conceding that
“ ‘[f]undamental rights of parents may not be denied, limited or restricted on the basis of
sexual orientation, per se’ ” but then removing the child from the lesbian mother’s custody
because of presumed but undemonstrated harm (quoting appellant)); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d
240, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (denying a modification of custody sought by a lesbian mother
despite numerous factors in her favor and against the unaffectionate father because contact with the mother’s lover would “impair the [children’s] emotional development”).
151. See Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Review Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL
3154530, at *5–7 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004) (citing studies and medical expert testimony
that homosexuality has no relevant impact on parenting); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN
RIGHTS, ADOPTION BY LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL PARENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT
LAW 2 (2004), http://www.nclrights.org/publications/pubs/adptn0204.pdf, citing the following studies: Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent
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ality is a negative factor that could lead to a child’s harm. Damron v.
Damron 152 is an example. There, the appellate court reversed a custody modification (granting custody to the father) that had been ordered because of the mother’s lesbian relationship. The court stated,
“[o]ther courts generally have recognized that, in the absence of evidence of actual or potential harm to the children, a parent’s homosexual relationship, by itself, is not determinative of custody.” 153 Although not as egregious as a per se rule that homosexual parents are
detrimental to their children, this formulation of the best-interests
standard still suggests something untoward about homosexuality
and asserts the state’s right to do something about it.
In re Marriage of R.S. 154 provides another example. There, too, the
appellate court reversed a modification of custody to the father based
on the mother’s homosexuality, stating, “[w]hile a court may consider
the custodial parent’s homosexual relationship when making a custody determination, the trial court’s function is limited to determining the effect of the parent’s conduct upon the children.” 155 Again, the
court suggests that a homosexual relationship will have a negative
effect. Why else may a court consider a parent’s homosexual relationship in making a custody determination?
Even in cases that seem intent on making no distinction between
gay and straight parents, such distinctions are made. Gay parents
are subtly discriminated against even when the court seems to think
it is eschewing that discrimination. For example, in In re Marriage of
Walsh 156 the Iowa Supreme Court removed a restriction on a gay faAdoption
by
Same-Sex
Parents,
109
P EDIATRICS
341,
341
(2002),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/109/2/341.pdf (“A growing body of scientific
literature demonstrates that children who grow up with 1 or 2 gay and/or lesbian parents
fare as well in emotional, cognitive, social, sexual functioning as do children whose parents
are heterosexual.”); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING 15 (2005),
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/publications/lgparenting.pdf (“Not a single study has found
children of lesbian or gay parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to
children of heterosexual parents. Indeed, the evidence to date suggests that home environments provided by lesbian or gay parents are as likely as those provided by heterosexual parents to support and enable children’s psychosocial growth.”); Susan Golombok &
Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the Sexual Orientation of Their Children? Findings
from a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian Families, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 9
(1996) (“[T]here is no evidence . . . to suggest that parents have a determining influence on
the sexual orientation of their children . . . .”); Charlotte Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Parenthood, in HANDBOOK OF PARENTING 255 (M.H. Bornstein ed., 1996) (noting that lesbians
and gay men have proved to be just as committed to the parental role and just as capable
of being good parents as their heterosexual counterparts).
152. 670 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 2003).
153. Id. at 875.
154. 677 N.E.2d 1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
155. Id. at 1300 (citation omitted); see also In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr.
2890–91 (Ct. App. 1988) (vacating a restriction on a homosexual father’s visitation rights
and holding that such a restriction requires a showing of harm).
156. 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990).
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ther’s visitation rights that had limited visitation to times when “ ‘no
unrelated adult’ ” was present and noted that the father was “a good,
loving and responsible father to his children.” 157 The court adopted
an almost indignant tone toward the lower court for instituting the
restriction. “We find no reason for the requirement that Michael’s
visitations be restricted to times when ‘no unrelated adult’ is present.
This unusual provision was obviously imposed on account of Michael’s homosexual lifestyle.” 158 Yet in the very next sentence, the
court reveals its own bias against homosexuality. “Michael argues
against this restriction and the concern which precipitated it by insisting the children would have no exposure to his lifestyle.” 159 Instead of ruling that the father’s homosexuality was not to be held as
a factor against him, the court found that the children would not be
exposed to his “lifestyle,” thus suggesting that such exposure could
have a negative impact. 160
Despite the connotations of the nexus rule, it is a step in the right
direction. Following a history of depriving gay parents of their rights per
se, something positive can be seen in courts affirmatively stating that
gay parents have parenting rights, even if that affirmation is qualified
with a phrase like “unless the lifestyle causes harm to the child.”
C. Best Interests Trump Private Agreements
Same-sex parents face even greater hurdles than their biologicalparent partners do when they assert parental rights. It is often unclear whether courts are applying a nexus test to same-sex partners
asserting parental rights, but courts routinely discount their preconception parenting agreements, 161 holding that they will be enforced
only if it is in the best interest of the child. 162 These claims of parental rights generally come up in custody determinations, which explains why courts are so quick to apply best-interests analysis, but
that decision operates as a rule favoring the biological parent because the nonbiological parent never gets an equal shot at establish-

157. Id. at 493.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Again, a preconception parenting agreement would simply be an agreement entered into before the conception of a child, contemplating and intending that conception,
and, in this case, establishing parenting rights in a nonbiological parent.
162. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892–93 (Mass. 1999) (stating that the
parties’ coparenting agreement was enforceable insofar as it was in the best interests of
the child and holding that an award was properly made under the court’s equity jurisdiction, since the partner was the child’s de facto parent and visitation would be in the child’s
best interest); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663–65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the
visitation provisions of an agreement between the parties settling the action would be enforceable if the provisions were in the child’s best interest).
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ing parental rights in the first place. 163 The goal should be, first, to
establish parental status and, second, to treat contractual parents
the same as biological or adoptive parents in the best-interests
custody analysis.
The argument for preferring biological parents in determining
parentage or custody is that biological parents are more invested in a
child’s well-being than are nonbiological parents. Stepparents offer a
model here. Evolutionary biologists have argued that stepparents
and other nonrelatives generally care less than biological parents for
children living in their homes. 164 However, for most same-sex couples, it is impossible for both members to be biological parents to a
child. Furthermore, unlike stepparents, the same-sex parents in all
of the cases discussed here were involved in the decision to conceive
the child, and, absent biological limitations, would gladly have become a genetic parent. These circumstances make nonbiological parents different from stepparents—even loving stepparents—who may
or may not intend to play a true parenting role to their spouse’s children.
The Supreme Court potentially has created still more hurdles for
same-sex parents by bolstering the rights of biological parents. In
Troxel v. Granville, 165 the Court found that the best-interests standard carries a presumption that “fit parents act in the best interests
of their children.” 166 Troxel overturned a visitation statute that
granted visitation to any petitioner (the paternal grandparents in
this case) if the court determined that the visitation was in the best
interests of the child. The Court ruled that it was not up to the state
to make this determination if the child was in the custody of a fit
parent and held that the statute violated the biological parent’s due
process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of her children. 167
[T]he decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for
the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit
parent’s decision of the kind at issue here becomes sub163. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 922 (listing cases where courts
“have refused to recognize the claim to visitation rights by a lesbian coparent”).
164. See ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND
EVERYDAY LIFE 103 (Vintage Books 1995).
Substitute parents will generally tend to care less profoundly for children than
natural parents [with the result that] children reared by people other than
their natural parents will be more often exploited and otherwise at risk. Parental investment is a precious resource, and selection must favor those parental
psyches that do not squander it on nonrelatives.
MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (Aldine de Gruyter 1988).
165. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
166. Id. at 68.
167. Id. at 68–69, 75.
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ject to judicial review, the court must accord at least
some special weight to the parent’s own determination. 168

Thus, although Troxel removes some of the state’s discretion in making best-interests determinations, it does so in favor of the biological
parent, which means that even without judicial bias, nonbiological
parents seeking parental rights face an uphill battle.
Some lower courts have interpreted Troxel as creating a “narrow
definition of ‘parents’ for the purpose of standing in custody and visitation cases” and have relied on Troxel to deny custody or visitation
to same-sex partners. 169
D. Second-Parent Adoption
As discussed previously in this Article, states typically recognize
only two kinds of legal parents: biological and adoptive. 170 This Part
discusses adoption, and in particular, second-parent adoption. Several courts have granted requests by lesbian partners to allow the
nonbiological parent to adopt the biological child of the other partner. 171 This kind of adoption is called second-parent adoption, and it
is distinguished from traditional adoption in that the biological parent retains her parental rights in a second-parent adoption and
agrees to share those rights with a nonbiological parent.
Second-parent adoption provides one solution to the problems described throughout this Article. It grants parental status to a nonbiological parent, so that parent has the same rights in a child as are
possessed by the biological parent. Unlike a parenting agreement between partners, a judge may not disregard a second-parent adoption,
not even if that judge thinks disregarding it is in the best interests of
the child. The best-interests standard still applies to adoptive parents throughout the adoption process and in custody and visitation
disputes, but once the adoption has taken effect, adoptive parents
stand on equal footing with biological parents. Thus, just as Troxel
determined for biological parents, adoptive parents should also re168. Id. at 70.
169. Sean H. v. Leila H., 783 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (stating that, even before Troxel, “[t]he Court of Appeals has made it unequivocally clear that biological or legal
strangers to a child have no standing under these statutes to pursue custody or visitation”). But see Bartholet, supra note 40, at 327 (“Troxel makes it clear that ‘parents’ are
constitutionally protected against inappropriate intervention in their families by nonparents, but it does nothing to limit how states may define parents and thus little to limit development of the functional parent trend.”).
170. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1 (1973).
171. See M NOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 126, at 922 (listing cases); see also
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-102 cmt. 9 pt. IA (explaining that the provision conferring
standing on a de facto parent to adopt with a custodial parent’s consent also applies to
second-parent adoptions).
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ceive the presumption that they are acting in the best interests of
their children. 172
But second-parent adoption is not a cure-all. For one thing, it is
not legal for homosexuals to adopt children in every state. Florida
bans adoption by homosexuals outright, 173 and other states, such as
Utah and Mississippi, limit adoption to married couples and couples
not of the same gender. 174 Furthermore, even in the number of states
where second-parent adoption by homosexuals is legal, 175 it may be
prohibitively expensive for many couples. Of course, the same could
be said for artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization, both of
which are relatively expensive. 176 Moreover, and perhaps much more
significant, prior to the issuance of a final adoption decree, the biological mother may be able to revoke her consent to the adoption for
any reason, including that she does not want her child to be reared
by a gay couple. 177 Relatedly, courts use the best-interests standard
172. However, the language of Troxel does admit a possible distinction. The presumption is that “fit” parents act in their children’s best interests. An argument could be made,
at least in the minority of states still following the “per se” rule, that homosexual parents
are not “fit.” However, this argument is unlikely to succeed in the context of two gay parents disputing custody or visitation because of its pot-calling-the-kettle-black nature. Furthermore, as the prevalence of the “nexus test” reveals, the trend among most courts is
away from viewing homosexuality as a negative factor, at least per se.
173. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2006) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute
may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”). Florida’s ban on gay adoption was upheld in
Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th
Cir. 2004).
174. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (2006) (“A child may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state. For purposes of this Subsection (3)(b), ‘cohabiting’ means residing
with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person.”); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2006) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited.”).
175. See White Paper, supra note 142, at 362 (stating that second-parent adoption is
available by statute or appellate decision in California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont
and that second-parent adoptions have been granted by trial court judges in counties of
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington).
176. An attorney who has consulted with J.A. and M. stated that the costs for a secondparent adoption are roughly $1500. That’s in addition to the $5500 they spent on the artificial insemination. This is inexpensive compared to an international adoption. See Irena
Choi Stern, From Russia, Looking for Love, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004, at 14WC (stating
that adoption of a Russian child could cost $15,000 or more). But it is far more expensive
than having a child (and acquiring parenting rights) naturally.
[I]n the Midwest having a baby with a normal delivery procedure has an average cost of $10,249, including physician and hospital cost. If you have a health
plan, it probably has negotiated a payment of only $5,150, of which the patient
will pay only about $940. Uninsured patients are often charged the full list price.
Terry Savage, Comparing Costs for Health Care Just Got Easier, MERRILLVILLE POSTTRIBUNE (Merrillville, Ind.), Oct. 1, 2006, at E2.
177. See, e.g., Commonwealth Adoptions International, Inc., Commonly Asked Domestic Adoption Questions, http://www.commonwealthadoption.org/adoption.php?id=USA
(last visited Feb. 27, 2006) (discussing birth mother’s rights to revoke consent under
Florida law); LawInfo.com, Adoption and Adoptive Parents Rights FAQ,
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to determine whether someone is fit to adopt, which introduces relatively standardless decision making into the adoption process, just as
it exists elsewhere in family law.
Beyond these fundamental hurdles, some courts have trouble with
the concept of second-parent adoption, even where the couple involved is heterosexual. This is because standard adoption procedures
require the biological parents to relinquish parental rights. 178 Second-parent adoption modifies the procedure such that one biological
parent retains parental rights and agrees to share those rights with
the second parent. Many adoption statutes create second-parent exceptions for stepparents, but, inasmuch as “stepparents” are by definition married to a parent, courts sometimes do not allow same-sex
couples to take advantage of these provisions because they are not
legally married and therefore not technically stepparents. 179 According to one recent overview of the law, second-parent adoption by unmarried couples is allowed in California, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont. 180
There is another potential barrier to second-parent adoptions: a
judge may determine that the second-parent adoption decree does
not confer jurisdiction on the court to rule on disputes concerning
child custody or support if a same-sex couple breaks up. 181 Instead, a
judge may find that there must be a marriage dissolution or paternity proceeding to confer statutory jurisdiction on the court. 182 Neither of those applies in the case of a same-sex, second-parent adoption. One judge in M. and J.A.’s state solved this problem by finding
that there is equitable jurisdiction to hear the issues, despite the abhttp://resources.lawinfo.com/index.cfm?action=results1&cat=104&act=faq&keywords=&sta
te=&subcatid=268&i=a (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) (discussing birth mother’s rights to revoke consent generally).
178. At least four state supreme or appellate courts have held that their adoption statutes do not allow second-parent adoptions. See In re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 492–
93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb. 2002); In re
Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); In re Angel Lace M., 516
N.W.2d 678, 682–83 (Wis. 1994).
179. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 683 n.8 (holding that the stepparent exception does not apply to same-sex couples even though an adoption by the same-sex partner of the biological parent would be in the child’s best interest).
180. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 151, at 8 (citing state statutes and
case law on second-parent adoption).
181. See Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002) (denying summary judgment
to a biological mother claiming the second-parent adoption decree awarding parental
status to her partner was invalid under Pennsylvania law and that the Nebraska court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear a custody dispute between the former partners,
but stating that a foreign judgment—the adoption decree—could be attacked by evidence
that the rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction). But see 25 CAUSES OF ACTION
2d 1 § 8 (2006) (stating that second-parent adoptions do confer standing on second parents
to sue for custody or visitation).
182. See supra note 96.
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sence of any statutory jurisdiction. “But the problem is the original
parent of a same sex couple could challenge the legality of the second
parent adoption and the Court’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction,”
their lawyer said. “And if the issue went to the Court of Appeals or
[the] Supreme Court, they could decide that same sex second parent
adoptions are not authorized in [this state].” 183
IV. PARENTING BY CONTRACT IN A BEST-INTERESTS WORLD
This Part suggests a two-part solution for same-sex parents asserting parental rights in the biological children of their partners,
particularly children conceived with the intention that both partners
would rear them as their own. It proposes, first, that courts should
enforce parenting agreements where such agreements are properly
drafted, just as they enforce adoption agreements, declarations of
parentage, and parentage established by a marriage contract. Second, contractual parents should be treated the same as other legal
parents in a best-interests analysis. This part of the proposal is essentially a restatement of the first part, but it highlights the distinction between establishing parental status on the one hand and determining custody based on a best-interests analysis on the other.
This Article argues that once a contractual parent has established
legal parental status, there should be no discretion within the bestinterests analysis to prefer the biological parent as such.
A. Contract-Only Proposals
This Article’s proposal differs from other proposals that argue for
strict enforcement of nonmarital family contracts. Such arguments
tend to focus on the rights of the parents without wrestling with the
problems presented by the best interests doctrine and the state’s
compelling interest in the welfare of its children. For example, Martha Ertman has written that business contracts are a useful model
for marriage, cohabitation, and polyamory because the flexibility of
the business contract better accommodates the wide variety of family
relationships that exist today than does the traditional marriage contract. 184 Ertman also argues that recognizing business-like family
contracts would help eradicate inequality by getting rid of the “race,
sex, gender, sexual orientation, and class hierarchies” created by
what she calls the “naturalized model of family.”185
Ertman concludes that the benefits of privatization outweigh the
drawbacks, but she does not address the state’s interest in maintain183. E-mail from J.A. to author (May 6, 2005, 13:21:47 CST) (on file with author).
184. Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 82, 100 (2001).
185. Id. at 80–81.
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ing the well-being of children, which is potentially a large drawback.
The state’s interest in its children potentially conflicts with the
private interest in enforcement of a business-like contract regarding parental rights.
Other scholars, such as Kathy Baker, agree that strict enforcement of parenting contracts is unrealistic.
The idea that courts would use simple objective theories of contract interpretation when children’s existence and ultimate care
are at stake is rather simplistic. . . . The sheer novelty of contracts
in the reproductive technology area makes it likely that courts will
need to struggle with objective interpretation. There are no commonly understood conventions. In addition, the courts’ and the
parties’ lack of familiarity with the technology make it important
for courts to scrutinize the contracts particularly carefully. . . . It is
implausible and arguably inappropriate to think that at this nascent stage of technological baby-making, a court would enforce a
surrogacy contract with the facility and efficiency with which it enforces a contract for the sale of widgets. 186

Yet, compared to the substantive review courts apply to parenting
contracts between same-sex partners—and the ease with which
courts disregard such contracts—surrogacy agreements almost are
enforced “with the facility and efficiency with which [courts enforce]
a contract for the sale of widgets,” particularly when the surrogacy
agreement involves a heterosexual married couple contracting with a
gestational surrogate (so that the intended parents are genetically
related to the child—their embryo is implanted in the gestational
surrogate’s womb). 187
Perhaps Baker’s assessment illustrates that, in the realm of contract enforcement, there is a spectrum of scrutiny granted by courts
(something akin to the tiers of scrutiny in constitutional law), based
on how controversial, or perhaps how personal or intimate, the terms
of the contract are, or how “nascent” the technology involved is. If
that is the case, it appears that the spectrum shifts according to contemporary norms (surrogacy agreements are more readily enforced
today than they were in the 1980s, for example). And all that can be
said of enforcement of parenting agreements is that, today, they are
on the far end of the spectrum from agreements concerning the sale
of widgets. And surrogacy agreements are somewhere in the middle.
As for the de facto parent doctrine, courts prefer to take a hands-on
approach there as well. Courts will investigate the conduct of the

186. Baker, supra note 9, at 30.
187. See supra Part I.C.2.
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parties to determine whether someone is a de facto parent rather
than take a contractarian approach. 188
B. This Article’s Proposal: Contract Within Best Interests
This Article’s proposal incorporates recognition of parenting
agreements into the best-interests doctrine. In practice, this would
require a court to treat a contractual parent the same as a biological
parent in the best-interests inquiry. The court would have no discretion to disregard a valid parenting agreement or to prefer a biological
parent on the basis of biology alone. The contractual parent would
have the same legal status as the biological parent.
By way of illustration, as the law exists today, a same-sex couple
like M. and J.A. might hire a lawyer to help them write a contract establishing the same parental rights in M. that J.A. has by virtue of
being the biological parent. They might have nothing but the child’s
best interests in mind; and in fact, the arrangement might be in the
child’s best interests (because, for example, it would establish a family unit with two legal parents, and the child would not have to worry
that M. would someday be cut out of his life if M. and J.A. broke up).
However, as the law stands today, a court charged with determining
the child’s best interests need not even read that contract. Some family courts may even find that they lack subject-matter jurisdiction to
interpret such contracts because they do not form a part of a divorce
decree or separation agreement. 189 In the event of a separation, the
court may decide to grant full custody to J.A. for any number of reasons. As a nonparent, M. may not even be granted standing to challenge the court’s order.
Under this Article’s approach, however, the court would have to
treat M. as an equal legal parent with J.A. This approach could be
implemented by a variety of procedural devices. A simple way to implement it would be to develop a form contract that clearly and thoroughly informed the parties of their rights and what rights they were
waiving. The form contract would state who was establishing parental rights and who (if anyone) was terminating parental rights. It
would also provide a window of time during which the parties could
change their minds (perhaps with a stipulated damages provision for
any parties with sunk costs). Finally, a requirement that the form
contract be filed with the state could serve a record-notice function
similar to that of a marriage certificate or birth certificate.

188. See supra note 42.
189. See Steven R.J. v. Nancy J., 459 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (“Where as here
[the parties’] ‘contract’ contains provisions beyond determining the issues of custody/visitation,
Family Court lacks the requisite equitable jurisdiction to reform or modify them.”).
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In cases where a written parenting contract conflicts with the
later, manifest intent of the parties (determined by their behavior
toward each other or the child), standard contract rules could apply. 190 For example, if the parties enter into a parenting contract and
later their intent changes such that both parties agree that one of
them should no longer have custody of the child, the couple could be
allowed to modify the contract to reflect their changed circumstances.
At the same time, if one party decides to avoid the contract unilaterally, the other party should be allowed to sue for breach, as well as
for support of the child. Allowing parties to contract away their parental rights is controversial, but parents avoid their parental obligations all the time, generally without the agreement of both parties. In
the rare case where both parties agree to the modification, their renegotiated contract should be honored, at least in regard to custody,
if not parental status. In the more common case where a parent unilaterally breaches, the legal consequences—a suit for breach or a suit
for child support—are not that different. A less controversial approach would be simply to apply family law principles to disputes involving contractual parents. Where a contractual parent abandons a
child, for example, the child or the parent should have a cause of action for support. Likewise, family courts should grant jurisdiction to
hear contractual parents’ custody and visitation disputes.
However implemented, this approach sends the message to all
parents that enforcing the parents’ private wishes is in the best interests of the child. This claim is based on the assumption that most
parents—biological or not—want what is best for their children. 191
190. Different factual scenarios will create harder and easier cases. An easy case is one
where the parents enter into a contract and their later behavior coincides with the terms of
the contract. A hard case is one where the parties enter into a contract, but one of them
does not realize the scope of the contract and the later behavior of both parties conflicts
with that contract. This is similar to what happened in K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005). See supra Part I.D.1. The lower court enforced an ova donor form contract that conflicted with the conduct (or “intent”) of the parties. Id. at 677–78. The California Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the intent of the parties, based on their conduct, controlled,
enforcing a sort of implied parenting contract. Id. at 679–82. This is perhaps the most difficult case because it requires delving into the subjective intent of two people whose relationship has since ended.
191. This is an empirical claim not proven here, but it can be assumed, perhaps optimistically, to be true. However, the literature on evolutionary biology suggests the contrary. See WRIGHT, supra note 164, at 103 (arguing that stepparents care less for their
children than biological parents for reasons relating to evolutionary fitness). Even if nonbiological parents’ private wishes regarding parenting generally do not coincide with the
best interests of their children, it seems plausible that if the law treated parents as if that
were the case, it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. An analogy to this can be found in
parenting: Parents who treat their children with respect and trust raise children who can
be respected and trusted. Parents who do not expect much of their children tend to raise
children who do not expect much of themselves.
It bears noting, too, that in the same-sex parenting agreements discussed here, one party
is always a biological parent. Inasmuch as courts do defer to biological parents’ wishes,
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Enforcing parenting contracts rewards the couple for taking the time
to think through how they want to rear their children and then putting those wishes into contractual terms. It rewards thoughtful, formal, family decision making, and it supports those decisions even if
they do not fit the status quo. This approach places the responsibility
for those contractual terms where it belongs: on the parents who entered into them. 192
This would change the analysis in many cases. To give just one
example, in a case like Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 193 where the
court refused to consider the parenting agreement but granted parenting rights under the presumed parent doctrine, this Article’s approach would simplify the court’s inquiry because it would allow reference to the contract to determine parentage. The court could then
go straight to the best-interests inquiry without an investigation into
whether the contractual parent was, in fact, a legal parent with
standing to petition for custody. Limiting parents to those who have
entered a formal agreement with the biological parent avoids the
Troxel problem of allowing just any third party to petition for visitation and custody.
Even if courts are leery of honoring the intent of nonbiological
parents, they should at least follow the intent of the biological parent
who has signed onto a parenting agreement with his or her partner.
The Supreme Court supports this view. Troxel held that the bestinterests standard carries “a presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children.” 194 A fit parent who has entered a
parenting agreement with his or her partner should be presumed to
have done so in the child’s best interests.
Furthermore, some courts have gone the step further recommended by this Article and enforced private agreements without reference to best interests. Davis v. Kania 195 is an example, albeit in the
minority, in the context of same-sex parents. This proposal differs
they should also defer to the nonbiological parents’ wishes where those wishes are the
same as the biological parents’ and are memorialized in a contract.
192. Granting custody to the biological parent without consideration of the parties’ intent, on the contrary, lets the nonbiological parent out of the deal after the relationship has
turned sour. Generally, in these cases, this is the parent fighting for parental rights, but it
could work the other way too. The nonbiological parent may be the stereotypical “deadbeat
dad.” Without court enforcement of a parenting contract, the child is left with only one
parent—a parent who might not have had that child if she knew the other parent would be
relieved of parenting duties at a judge’s discretion. This may be deemed acceptable if both
parents know there is a strong possibility their contract will not be enforced and decide to
have a child anyway, but if they enter a parenting contract expecting it to be binding, it is
unfair to the child and the custodial parent, if not also to the noncustodial parent, not to
enforce it.
193. 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Ct. App. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005).
194. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
195. 836 A.2d 480 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003); see also supra Part I.D.2.b.
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from what many courts have been doing already, which is enforcing
private agreements if they are in the child’s best interests. This proposal would separate the inquiry. It would first allow parents to establish parental status by contract. Second, it would treat contractual
parents the same as biological or adoptive parents in any subsequent
best-interests analysis.
Finally, this solution sends the message to parents that parents—
biological or not—presumptively act in their children’s best interests,
and it is generally not the place of courts to disturb their wishes, particularly where they have taken the time and effort to memorialize
those wishes in contract. With that freedom comes responsibility for
the children contemplated in the parenting agreement. Courts should
presume to enforce such contracts, both to protect the rights of the
nonbiological parent and to cement the responsibilities of that nonbiological parent to the child. This should be the right of all children
with unmarried parents.
V. CONCLUSION
In time, same-sex couples likely will gain the right to marry and,
with it, the rights that accompany parenting a child. At that future
date, it may no longer seem necessary to protect those rights by contract. 196 But that future date may be a long way off. As noted at the
beginning of this Article, states are increasingly banning gay marriage by constitutional amendment and state statute. Waiting
around for someday could guarantee that that day comes later rather
than sooner. Children grow up quickly. They could use the stability
and certainty of two legal parents in the meantime.

196. However, as stated throughout, neither gay nor straight couples should be forced
to marry to acquire parenting rights. Should they decide to contract for those rights instead of getting married—for whatever reason—their parenting contracts should be enforceable. I only point out that, as same-sex marriage eventually enters the mainstream,
the need for parenting contracts may not seem quite as pressing because such contracts
will no longer be the only way to establish parental rights.

